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Abstract 
 
How do digital technologies function for the state in its pacification strategies 
concerning the dissident political bodies, their subjectivities and communicative 
capabilities? How does resistance take place against the surveillance practices which 
come to the fore as a state form, as a means of social control, and as a mechanism of 
creating manageable and disciplined crowds? Drawing upon the ethnographic data, 
this article attempts to discuss these questions, by focusing on the contemporary 
politics surrounding the Kurdish movement in Turkey. In particular, it presents an 
analysis of the digitized surveillance and resistance of Kurds both of which come to 
function as crucial components of the contemporary power regimes in Turkey.  
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Introduction  
 
This article explores the ways in which the use of digital technologies has become a 
political power in Kurdish/Turkish relations in novel ways. Kurdish/Turkish relations 
have historically been shaped by the Kurdish insurgent nationalist movement, claiming 
the cultural and political rights of Kurds, including the official recognition of Kurds as 
a unique cultural group as well as the free exercise of their cultural identity and 
language in state institutions, and the pacification regimes of the state that regards this 
movement as a major threat to the territorial and political status quo in the region.1 The 
object and target of the contemporary form of power is the political bodies, acting and 
speaking for this movement, their political subjectivities and their communicative 
capabilities.  
 This new form of power, which makes use of digital technologies, functions in 
two paradoxical and related ways.  As a state form, it captures the flow of information 
                                                 
1 See Kemal Kirişçi, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University 
Press, 2004) and Hakan Özoğur,  Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State )New York: NYU 
Press, 2004). 
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and colonizes physical and cognitive spaces of bodies in their daily practices and 
communications through preemptive, decentralized and routinized digital surveillance, 
and accordingly feeds off the juridical and police systems where collected data become 
evidences to put thousands of people on counterterrorism trials with accusations of the 
involvement, support or sympathy for terrorism. As a form of resistance, on the other 
hand, it enables the rupture of the control over information networks and provoking 
new language to emerge that both negotiate, and resist the all-encompassing 
colonization of communication. Importantly, Kurdish activists have been using these 
technologies, particularly the Internet, to produce effective critiques of these trials, the 
preemptive surveillance, and to continue generating new discourses and 
representations, asserting their ethnic and political identities. While neither the control 
nor the resistance of Kurds take place only in digital spaces through the applications of 
information technologies; these technologies provide a new rationale for the state 
control and for the Kurdish resistance in terms of creating new communicative spaces 
where all public spaces are shrunk due to the prevalent forms of surveillance.  
 Apart from an attempt to show that the Turkish state has become a truly 
technological surveillant state, particularly in relation to the dissident politics which is 
not limited to the Kurdish movement but enacted on Kurds more forcefully, this study 
aims to discuss the ways in which the surveilled bodies, namely Kurds, experience, 
manage and resist the new forms of power in practice, in their daily lives and in their 
political activities. In doing so, it also aims to contribute to the literature on the new 
forms of power that largely focuses on surveillance or resistance in western societies.  
 In what follows, I will first engage with some of the relevant theoretical 
literature on modern and postmodern forms of control as well as on resistance and draw 
an outline the ways in which new control regimes operationalizes its power on 
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surveilled bodies and the immanent potentialities of resistance can arise in the forms of 
resisting counterpublics. Then, I will briefly contextualize the evolving political 
situation within the history of Kurdish/Turkish relations, and present the analysis of my 
ethnographic research that I have completed in 2012 with 40 users of communication 
technologies in different cities of Turkey. I will suggest that the technological forms of 
manipulative surveillance contributes to the colonization of communicability of bodies, 
by amputating the ordinary language, shrinking the boundaries between public and 
private spaces and distorting the intimate relationship between the users and their tools 
of communications that allow them to have a constant contact with their acquaintances 
and other strangers that they like to reach. In response to this, the resistive politics aims 
to gain the means of communicability particularly through the use of the Internet 
(mostly the social media) to create new languages, new selves, new modes of speech 
and new places for discussions and exchange that do not only address the Kurdish users 
but also the non-Kurds who are unfamiliar with the Kurdish reality.  Finally, in the last 
part, I will sketch an outline of contemporary authoritarian regime of the technological 
surveillant state and the resistive politics of digital young Kurds, which, I will suggest, 
also informs the whys and wherefores of the Gezi Movement of 2013 that has become 
one of the most diverse revolt of young people, including the Kurds, in the history of 
Turkey.  
Understanding Surveillance and Resistance in Contemporary Societies 
 
 Recent studies on surveillance show that there is an intrinsic link between the 
digitization of information, the ubiquitous use of information technologies by 
citizens/consumers, and the unprecedented level of recording, storing, and 
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manipulation of information by those with an access to the data 2. As bodies are 
immersed in digital spaces through the exposure and use of credit cards, electronic 
IDs, cellphones, telephones, the Internet, city cameras, data-mining systems etc., they 
leave traces behind themselves as they move, act and communicate within the 
fluctuating and flexible networks. Hence these facilities and possibilities of 
monitoring provided by digital technologies amplify the state capabilities for control, 
which give rise to the concerns about the maintenance of democracy and civil rights3 
and the rise of new forms of authoritarianism.4 Deleuze defines this new form of 
society that is administered and managed through computerized systems of 
surveillance as ‘society of control’, where mechanisms of command become ever 
more fluid and immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the bodies of 
citizens/consumers that are no longer individuals (corporeal bodies) but dividuals, 
‘consisting of modulations of coded information’, internally divided into measurable 
and adjustable pieces, data5. The relationship between power and individual in this 
new form of society (imperial society as they call it), Hardt and Negri argue, is ‘open, 
qualitative and affective’; the social production of subjectivities is not limited to 
places; power is everywhere and nowhere; generating ‘non-places’ where the social 
production of subjectivities refers to the ‘fluid processes of the generation and the 
                                                 
2 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October 59 (1992): 3-7; David 
Lyon “Surveillence Technology and Surveillance Society’ in Modernity and Technology ed. 
Misa, T, Brey, P. Feenberg, (2004) 170- 84 
3  Kirsty Best, “Living in the control society: surveillance, users and digital screen 
technologies”, International Journal of Cultural Studies  13, no.5 (2010) 5-24. 
4 Evgeny Morozov, The net delusion: The dark side of Internet Freedom, (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2011). 
5 William Bogard, “The Coils of a Serpent: Haptic Space and Control Societies”, C Theory, 
(2007) (http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=581). 
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corruption of subjectivity’.6 ‘The indefiniteness of the place of the social production 
corresponds to the indeterminacy of the form of the subjectivities produced’.7  
 The technological control partake in these subjectification processes, 
generating a simulated version of surveilled bodies, a sort of additional self,8 or a data 
double of pure virtuality9 whose narrative is necessarily different from the reflection 
of an original referent due to the technological re-presentation.10 The re-presentation 
and re-creation of bodies in scanscapes is used for a variety of tasks within 
increasingly dominant modes of risk management, including the financial, ecological, 
and security risks.11 Particularly with regard to (vague) definitions of terrorism, which 
is regarded as one of the most threatening risks of contemporary societies, law and 
technology function relationally for the discrimination of population. While anti-
terrorism law contributes to the codifying of classifications through which only some 
are taken as the focus of surveillance, surveillance of those generate evidential data 
that might easily end up in creation of different versions of life (of crime) lived by the 
surveilled outside their control.12  As Ball (2005) suggests, surveillance is not only 
understood as information and as knowledge but also as protection from threats. In 
order for the state to justify the prevalent surveillance on selected bodies, it also needs 
to maintain the functioning of synopticism13 (the communicative machines of fear and 
panic) through which the viewers’ (and/or spectators’) consciousness are educated to 
                                                 
6 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, London: Harvard University Press, 2000),196. 
7 ibid, 196. Italics in original. 
8 Mark Poster, The Mode of Information, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
9 Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson, “The Surveillant Assamblage” in The Surveillance 
Studies Reader, (ed) S.P. Hier and J. Greenberg (2007). 
10 Kirsty Best “Living in the control society”, 90; Kirstie Ball “Organization, Surveillance and 
the Body: Towards a Politics of Resistance”, Organization 12, no. 1 (2005): 89-108. 
11 David Lyon, “Resisting Surveillance” in ” in The Surveillance Studies Reader, (ed) S. Hier 
and J. Geenberg (2007). 
12 İbid, 175. 
13  Thomas Mathiesen “The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault’s Panopticon Revisited, “ 
Theoretical Criminology 1, no.2 (1997): 215-34. 
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believe in the deadly threat of terrorism in their society as well as the operations of 
panopticism 14 (through prisons) where risky bodies of terrorism are confined and 
excluded from public spaces of action and communications.15 Thus, in contemporary 
societies the net of regimentation of masses and individual bodies is broadened and 
tightened through digital surveillance which does not replace but strengthens the 
existing forms of control such as synopticism and panopticism.16  
 As a consequence of these global flows in controlling citizens/consumers and 
the local investments in centralized civil registry systems, digitized remote listening, 
advanced filtering systems, data mining systems, city cameras etc., the Turkish state 
has also become a technological surveillent state which makes use of all these facilities 
to monitor the population, particularly the dissident political subjects.17 Importantly, 
the current counterterrorism laws based on vague and indeterminate definition of 
terrorists acts, including non-violent actions and discourses, such as ‘poetry, painting, 
daily columns and articles’, demoralizing and criticizing the security forces -as it was 
recently defined by the Minister of Internal Affairs in Turkey18 - enable the pervasive 
and manipulative surveillance of the dissident groups which end in the confinement of 
thousands of people in prisons and on trials as suspects of terrorism. The role of 
technology in gathering suspicious documents or mysterious talks is important due to 
the fact that technological evidences create a perception of precision, validity and 
reliability of evidences in the eyes of larger public. Moreover, technologies are re-
                                                 
14 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1977) 
15 Ball, “Organization, Surveillance and the Body”, 94. 
16 Lyon “Surveillance Technology and Surveillance Society”, 170; Marx, “What’s new about 
the ‘new surveillance’”, 83. 
17 Selma Arslantaş-Toktaş et al Türkiye’de Digital Gözetim: T.C. Kimlik Kartlarından E-
Kimlik Kartlarına Yurttaşın Sayısal Bedenlenişi, (İstanbul: Alternatif Bilişim Derneği, 2012); 
Çağatay Topal, “Global Citizens and Local Powers: Surveillance in Turkey,” Social Text 83, 
no.2 (2005): 85-93. 
18 Reporters Without Borders Report, “Turkey: The world’s biggest prison for journalists”, 
accessed December,  30, 2012, https://en.rsf.org/turkey-turkey-world-s-biggest-prison-for-19-
12-2012,43816.html. 
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presented as the truth production machines, as they are evidences of counterterrorism 
trials, and of discrediting messages about the political subjects in media coverage. The 
lack of autonomous and independent structure of news media and the pressures that 
journalists face in the contemporary mediascape19 as well as the juridical systems that 
are in crisis in terms of providing the basis20 for justice, all contributes to the operations 
of new pacification regimes that aim to ‘tame the social, political and economic 
forces’21 in the seemingly democratic, but essentially authoritarian ways. 
 My analysis of this new form of power is based on an argument that 
possibilities of resistance are immanent to the forms of power.22 If there is no place 
outside the regimes of control, as Hardt and Negri argue, we should find ways of 
resistances in all non-places. The digital technoscape is a non-place where one 
                                                 
19 According to the latest research of RWB (Reporters Without Borders), Turkey is ‘the 
world’s biggest prison for journalist’ where 72 journalist and media personnel most of whom 
work for pro-Kurdish news organizations are in prison (2012). Although the Turkish 
mediascape is diversified and extensive, it has mostly been mute or affirmative of the state 
operations concerning the Kurdish unarmed political bodies. Even after the killing of 34 
Kurdish civilians in Uludere/Roboski in a military air strike in December 2011, the whole 
institutionalized mediascape of Turkey had been mute about the attacks for some 10 hours 
until the official explanation of the event given by the spokesperson of the government as an 
unfortunate technological accident in the war of terror. In a similar manner, the hunger strikes 
of imprisoned KCK suspects did not get coverage in the national media until the strikers have 
come to a deadly stage. 
20 The ways Turkish juridical systems make use of technological surveillance not only in 
KCK cases but also other counter-terrorism trials such as Oda-TV, Ergenekon give rise to the 
voiced concerns in international and national arena. These concerns persisted over ‘the rights 
of defense, lengthy pre-trial detention and excessively long and catch-all indictments’ (EU 
Commission Turkey 2012 Progress Report), ‘the technological criminalization of cases where 
mundane data are presented through copy and paste of wire-tapping to create suspicion of a 
crime’ (Selçuk Kozağaçlı and Tanıl Bora, “Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği Başkanı Selçuk 
Kozağaçlı ile söyleşi: ‘Elastik ve yapışkan bir ağ,’” Birikim  273 (2012): 35. (My 
translation)), and finally enhanced scrutiny of the legitimacy of the trials which seemed to be 
against ‘the free expression of their [suspects] opinions and ideas, in particular in the context 
of non-violent discussion of the Kurdish issue’ as the vice-chairman of UN Human rights 
committee says (Stephanie Nebayah, “Turkey using anti-terrorism law to quash debate: U.N’, 
Reuters, accessed January 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/01/us-turkey-un-
rights-idUSBRE8A012020121101) . 
21 Tarek Masoud defines authoritarianism as such in his ‘The Road to (and from) Liberation 
Square, Journal of Democracy 22 no:3 (2011): 20-34. See also Zeynep Tüfekçi and 
Christopher Wilson, ‘Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: 
Observations From Tahrir Square’, Journal of Communication 62, (2012): 363-379. 
22 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 5. 
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willingly or not is subjected to the fluid regimes of control and subjectification 
processes. The fluidity in this regard contributes to the aforementioned ways of control 
as well as to the interruption of control through the creation of a spatio-temporal gap 
between the surveilled and surveillor and of an anonymity of the users who will to 
partake in meaning from within the flexible and fluctuating networks of digitized 
power. 23  The disrupt of control within a limited period of time and scale has 
potentialities of resistance only if the meaning making process differs from the 
dominant ways of addressing the individuals or publics. Digital communication 
technologies do not have a force outside social systems through which discourses and 
meanings are produced and shared across different social groups within the network at 
high speed. 24  The interpellation into the usership (who consents for her own 
surveillance) of the net is based on the promise of a recognition of an ordinary 
individual being an active produser25 of the self, language and textual representation in 
the virtual presence of others in ways impossible in face-to-face relations. Although 
there is always an original referent to all virtual bodies on these platforms, each and 
every user that is present on the web of virtual relations and spaces is recreated in 
artificiality. The artificiality that is produced in the performative uses of the net within 
the work/play of self-design26 reveals both the limitations (such as digital divide, the 
                                                 
23 Ball “Organization, Surveillance and the Body”, 94; Lyon “Resisting Surveillance”, 370. 
24  Allacquere Rosanne Stone, The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the 
Mechanical Age, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996) 
25 The Web 2.0 allows for the methods of production of communication and knowledge does 
not only belong to the companies, rulers etc., but also to nearly everybody who has access to 
the net. The term produser refers to the evaporating distinction between producer and 
consumer within web 2.0. Claudia K. Grinnel also suggests that Web 2.0 ‘has also shifted 
attention from access to information towards access to people’. With Web 2.0, there emerged 
millions of online resources such as blogs, wikis, and virtual communities that allow people 
to meet, share ideas and collaborate in new ways. See her article, ‘From Consumer to 
Produser: Who Keeps Shifting My Paradigm? (We Do!), Public Culture, 21, no. 3 (2009): 
577-589. 
26  Boris Groys, “Obligation to Self-Design”, e-flux, 11 (2008) (http://www.e-
flux.com/journal/the-obligation-to-self-design/). 
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subsisting hierarchies between races, ethnicities, gender within the virtual spaces) and 
potentialities (the renewal of speech and diction to present and create oneself that one 
finds in the virtual social relations) of self-creation. Hardt and Negri write, ‘once we 
see ourselves for the simians and cyborgs we are’, we then need to participate in ‘the 
continuous constituent project to create and re-create ourselves and our world27’ in the 
domain of artificiality. 
  This sort of creation and re-creation of selves and worlds that we inhabit 
within digital technoscape can be best understood with the Warner’s conceptualization 
of counterpublics. 28 He writes, ‘counterpublics are publics’, too, that are produced 
through circulatory discourses, addressing diverse people, including the strangers, 
hailing them into particular positions, ‘providing a sense of active belonging that masks 
or compensates the real powerlessness of human agents in capitalist society’.29 The 
difference of counterpublic to public discourse, on the other hand, is that it ‘remains 
distinct from the authorities’ and that ‘have critical relation to power’. 30   The 
counterpublic does not conflict with power because it comes to the fore as a reflection 
of subculture or oppositional identities formed elsewhere, but precisely as the form of 
recreation of languages, discourses and of subjectivities that challenge the dominant 
groups, ideas, policies as well as speech genres and modes of address that constitute the 
public. The potentialities of counterpublics are always immanent in all organizations of 
publics that have necessary tensions, perversities and ambiguities for them to function 
continuously.  
                                                 
27 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 92. 
28 Michael Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics”, Public Culture 14, no. 1 (2002): 49-90. 
29 ibid, 81. 
30 Sheridan D, Ridolfo J and Michel A, The Available Means of Persuasion. Anderson, (SC: 
Parlor, 2012), 101. 
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Functioning like a container 31 for millions of users, the Internet becomes a 
social laboratory, where users interact with each other through the creation of their 
representations and improvise their discourses. I argue that the possibilities of 
improvisations through the circulatory discourses within the net contributes to the 
formation of counterpublics for Kurds, who search for the means of communicability, 
and for the new ways of expressing themselves as well as recreating themselves with a 
novel discourse and language that degrade the power, the disciplinary institutions, and 
the dominant political culture. The Kurdish counterpublic is not solely instituted 
through the discourses in the net, it has intertextual relations with all others that have 
been posing critiques against the state authoritarianism, media synopticism and power 
relations that constitute the dominant discourses and practices, aiming to create a 
defeated, accepting and docile consumers/citizens out of Kurdish population.  
Kurds of Turkey 
 
Kurds constitute the largest nation in the world without a state, and they 
struggle for their cultural and political rights in countries where they reside. Kurds of 
Turkey have been in revolt against the political project of the Turkish Republic, which 
aimed to develop nationhood based on the Turkish language, and the imagined national 
identity that required a break with the religiosity, local traditions, and non-Turkic 
ethnic identities for the last century32. Resistance coming out of Kurdish population 
against this establishment had first had the characteristics of the local-armed nationalist 
and religious rebellions, then gained the traits of a wider, modern, leftist, pacifist 
                                                 
31  See Zoe Sofia, “Container Technologies,” Hypatia 15, no.2  (2000): 181- 201, for 
understanding of how communication technologies become a container, housing the users’ 
memories, data and also her imaginations, desires and unaccomplished wills. 
32  Mesut Yeğen “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 34, (1999): 555-68; Özoğur, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, 
4. 
 11 
nationalist movement in the ‘60s and the ‘70s33. With the rise of the armed movement 
of the PKK in the early ‘80s, the ethnic and cultural consciousness grew and spread 
amongst almost all Kurds living in Turkey.34 Violence and human rights violations 
against Kurds during the military dictatorship of 1980-3, prohibition of the use of 
Kurdish both in private and public spaces, and the clearance of villages in the south 
eastern parts of Turkey under the Emergency State Rules of the ‘90s, provoked many 
Kurds to become involved in activism and even join to the armed forces35 .   
 For millions of politically active Kurds, the use of media technologies became 
of crucial significance, signifying the possibility of deciphering human rights violations 
against Kurds, making and inventing themselves in the way they imagine, and 
producing a sense of nation without an officially recognized territory of nation. A 
newspaper Özgür Gündem and a satellite TV-channel, MedTV were established and 
had become extremely popular in Kurdish populated areas, and consequently been 
treated as terrorist propaganda machines by the state - journalists were killed, 
readers/viewers were arrested or exposed to the violence of security forces in the 
‘90s 36 . After the bloody years of the ‘90s, a relatively freer environment was 
established due to the capture of the PKK leader, and the policies of democratization 
processes adopted as a result of the country’s aspiration to become a member of EU in 
the early 2000s.37 These changes did not put an end to the war between the PKK and 
Turkish army, but yielded to the representations of Kurdish voters in the parliament and 
in municipality with a distinct political party, and to the artistic and medial presence of 
Kurds in creative industries and in digital media technologies to a certain extent. The 
                                                 
33 Kirişçi, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Gambetti, “The Spatial Dynamics of the Kurdish and Zapatista Movements”, 45. 
36  Hassanpour, “Satellite Footprints as National Borders”, 53; Gambetti, “The Spatial 
Dynamics of the Kurdish and Zapatista Movements”, 43. 
37 Ibid. 
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Kurdish diaspora has appropriated desktop and electronic publishing to develop a 
standardized Kurdish as well as an archive of extensive literature, both of which aim to 
produce a sense of belonging to a culture, literature and history.38 Likewise, Kurdish 
cinema and music started to be represented and performed in cultural scenes, as a 
means for Kurds to assert their cultural and ethnic identity more strongly than ever 
through creative industry.  
 In a relatively freer environment, the government has initiated the ‘Kurdish 
opening’ in 2009 which is based on a political understanding of giving ‘individual 
cultural rights to Kurds’ such as the homecoming of PKK militants, opening Kurdish 
courses and establishing a state-run Kurdish speaking television channel.39 However, 
these developments have instigated the national hysteria and produced the sense of ‘we 
gave enough already’ on the part of larger Turkish public,40 and did not give rise to the 
satisfaction of political Kurds, who demand a neutral definition of citizenship that 
would not exclude Kurdish ethnic identity and warranties allowing the free exercise of 
the Kurdish identity, including the use of their mother language in education and in 
legislation.   
 Particularly after 2011 while the uprisings in the Middle East were spreading 
to different countries, the state has changed its strategy from providing cultural rights at 
individual levels to a hard-line approach whose aim seems to ‘finish off the PKK’ and 
cut the organic links between the Kurdish masses and the PKK and the pro-Kurdish 
political party (BDP), through a new tactic whose components did not exclude military 
                                                 
38 Romano, “Modern communication technology in ethnic nationalist hands”, 127. See also 
Bilgin Ayata “Kurdish Transnational Politics and Turkey’s Changing Kurdish Policy: The 
Journey of Kurdish Broadcasting from Europe to Turkey”, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies 19 no. 4 (2011): 523-533, for an analysis of the effects of Kurdish media 
networks established by the Kurdish diaspora both on transnational politics and on the 
internal policies of state-run Kurdish speaking TV channel. 
39 Yeğen, “The New Kurdish Movie”. 
40 ibid 
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operations against the PKK militants, but focused more on judiciary and police system 
through which thousands of people are put on anti-terror trials as well as on the 
propaganda machine of media through which politicians of BDP attempted to be 
discredited. 41  As a consequence of this new political strategy, more than twelve 
thousand people, including Kurdish politicians, journalists, students, doctors, mayors 
etc., are put on trials with accusations of aiding, abetting or being a member of the 
terrorist organization called KCK (the Union of Kurdish Communities which is an 
urban organization of the armed PKK) with evidences consisting mostly of 
technological data collected out of digital surveillance.  This research takes up the 
effects of policies regarding KCK cases and this pacification regimes of the state on the 
part of Kurdish population within the period between 2009 and 2012. In 2013, the 
Turkish state has once again adopted a relatively moderate-line approach, and launched 
a ‘peace process’, following an agreement with the PKK leader that aims to resolve the 
Kurdish conflict with constitutional reforms on the condition that, as far as the public 
knows, the PKK guerrillas withdraw from the Turkish territory outside the national 
borders. However, the KCK inmates are still not released and the expected reforms 
have not been actualized as of the 2013 summer.  
The Data  
  
The data is derived from in-depth interview that I have conducted in 2012 with 
40 users of communication technologies such as telephone, cellphone, or the Internet in 
İstanbul (17), Diyarbakır (9), Ankara (2) and Mardin (4). The sample focused on 
                                                 
41 One example of this is that the photos of deputies having dinner during the period of 
hunger strike is broadcasted in televisions as part of the coverage of the Prime Minister’s 
speech when he said ‘there is only one person who is on death fast in Turkish prison. But the 
BDP members who tell them to die are having lamb kebab”. See “No Hunger strikes says PM 
amid rallies”, Hurriyet Daily News (2012), accessed January 4, 2013, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-hunger-strikes-says-pm-amid-
rallies.aspx?pageID=238&nid=33710. 
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middle class Turkish (5) and Kurdish users, between 18-65 years of age, including 
digital activists (mostly between 18-40), university students, lawyers, teachers, 
intelligent service officers, NGO workers and unemployed individuals. The reason for 
the inclusion of Turkish users into the sample is to understand the effect of 
technological surveillance on Kurdish subjects at a comparative level where the 
generalized surveillance does not seem to concern only Kurds but also others. The 
sample focused largely on the middle class, because particularly Kurdish users of 
personal digital communication technologies like computers, cell phone and social 
networks seem to belong in the middle class. Twenty of the sample were women.  
  The in-depth interviews, each of which lasted an average of one-to-two hours, 
were organized with the aim of learning if the interviewees fear and doubt about their 
surveillance, how they react to the surveillance practices and how they negotiate and/or 
resist these forms of control. While some of my Turkish informants in the sample 
seemed to be less interested in politics, all my self-defined Kurdish interviewees were 
politically conscious subjects due to the fact that defining oneself as a Kurd in the 
political landscape of Turkey is already a political statement regardless of the users’ 
political engagement with a political party and organization. Regardless of their 
political involvement, all my informants were well-informed about the current 
surveillance practices of the state. Most of them expressed the fear and doubt in 
relation to their potential/actual surveillance and the irritation due the infringement of 
their privacy. And yet, when the issue came down to the intensity of fear and the 
perceived risk of being under the constant surveillance, there seemed to appear 
differences between politically active informants and others, and Kurds and Turks 
alike.  
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  All of my digital activist interviewees use smart phones -which have become 
ubiquitous gadgets among many from different social classes- that have connection to 
the Internet. All of them are regular users of Facebook (the most visited page in 
Turkey)42 and some of them are Twitter users. The experienced ones in virtual politics 
participate in forum discussions, contribute to the urban-dictionaries and open blogs as 
well. They are truly members of the user publics of the digital ecologies. The ones who 
reside in Istanbul and Ankara are more included in heterogeneous crowds of virtual 
friendship networks (that do not require an offline acquaintances or kinship), where all 
of their personal messages become public as they write in their personal pages or 
open/closed Facebook groups, Twitter hash-tags and blogs. The fact that 
telecommunication interactions through telephone talks and texting and email exchange 
constitutes the freer sites for the centralized technological surveillance of the state and 
that finding evidences and building fabricated images and conversations in social 
media sites are relatively more difficult due to the policies of Facebook and Twitter that 
require official application of the Turkish state to give the private information of the 
users make most of these users to prefer these social networks for their cultural and 
political struggle. Despite that Facebook is regarded as less trusted social network due 
to the experiences of users whose groups were closed by the company with an excuse 
of many complaints of other Facebook users, it remains to be the most popular platform 
where the users can reach bigger and more heterogeneous crowds.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 According to Alexa.com, the most popular site is Facebook, then follows Google Türkiye, 
Youtube etc. Twitter has been within the top ten, but after Gezi Protests where Twitter has 
become one of the leading virtual platform for the mobilization of protestors, it has be 
attracted more users. (see www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/TR). 
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The Production of Control and Its Effects 
 
 The surveillant regime of Turkey is not a new phenomenon. The novelty lies 
in the growth of technological authoritarianism that amalgamates the force of law, 
police and technology to produce digital materials that can easily be manipulated to 
generate fake conversations, fabricated images and narratives of crimes when there is 
no rational basis that prove the crime.  Although one cannot argue that all evidences 
presented in the indictments of anti-terror trials are based on the technological mutation 
of non-evidence of crimes, there seems to be some concrete reasons that worry the 
lawyers, human rights associations and civil right activists about the way technological 
control functions to manufacture crime.  One of the lawyers of KCK case in Diyarbakır 
explains his experiences in these trials: 
 
  The indictments start with the hundreds of pages of KCK 
history, then continues with few testimonials of hidden 
witnesses and then hundreds of pages of transcriptions, 
obtained from remote listening, transcriptions of wiretapping, 
text messages etc. All of these are read in courts. So the 
private lives of all these suspects are heard by everyone…the 
court becomes like a gossip program…since none of these 
information prove any crime on rational basis, then the 
prosecutors claim that they are encrypted messages.  
 
 Some of the examples of the evidences written in the indictments are as following: 
SMS message like ‘37 B Black’ sent from a suspect to her sister, asking her to buy a 
bra in this size and color is interpreted by the prosecutor as an encryption of a bomb, or 
a telephone conversation where the Turkish professor speaking on the phone to another 
KCK suspect where she is invited to a meeting and responds by saying ‘inshallah’ is 
interpreted as the conscious admission of participating in the terrorist organizations’ 
meetings, or a photograph of an illiterate old Kurdish woman in a protest in Diyarbakır 
taken by police cameras is claimed to be an evidence of her managerial position in 
KCK, responsible for sending emails to protestors to invite them to the violent protest. 
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In the face of these sort of evidences, lawyers maintain that they feel desperate and ‘do 
not know how to defend them’ as one lawyer in Diyarbakır says or ‘I feel as if I was 
given a role to play in an absurd comedy, a sort of deadly joke’ as another lawyer in 
Mardin says. The progress of trials is also blocked by the denial of the request of 
Kurdish suspects to defend themselves in Kurdish in courts, while almost half of the 
wiretappings are in Kurdish and translated into Turkish as evidences of their ties to 
terrorism.  
  While the cases are in deadlock due to the denial of the suspects’ demand to 
give testimony in Kurdish and to the lack of hard evidences, proving the crime on 
rational basis, the effect of surveillance on the surveilled bodies becomes pressing, as 
these bodies feel the constant relentless of being watched in their daily activities and 
communications. A female municipal worker, who is on KCK trial without detention 
with the accusation of helping the KCK without being a member of it, explains this 
effect:  
when you are taken into custody, they put all information on 
the table they collected throughout some time without your 
knowledge…it’s terrifying to see…I mean, as if I was always 
naked…and the way they present all these things in 
indictments…all pieces are sewn together to create another 
you… the data is yours, but the story is not… what is most 
terrifying is not my possible detention or imprisonment, but to 
see how they control everything, every minute of your life and 
manipulate everything in the way they want. 
 
Just as this informant does, most of my Kurdish interviewees, regardless of 
them being on trials, describe the felt effect of the amalgamated force of law and 
technology not as the fear of confinement in prison with evidences whose collection 
and interpretation seem to be outside of their control, much as they express the constant 
relentlessness of being watched in every moment of their lives. Although the 
consciousness of surveillance is not limited to the political Kurds but spread to almost 
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anyone, the Turkish activists that I have interviewed noted that ‘we will definitely 
come after Kurds in the state’s list of usual suspects’ as a well-known female activist in 
her ‘30s told me in Istanbul, by referring to the hierarchy of risky subjects within 
categories of suspicion where the Kurds sit on the first row. The amalgamated force of 
law and technology does not seem to implant a pressing fear of imprisonment on the 
part of political Kurds as much as it does on the non-Kurds, perhaps because as a 
doctoral student has expressed to me ‘if you define yourself as a Kurd in this society 
and if you decide to struggle for your identity and language, you must be ready for 
imprisonment, death, loss of your future… it is a high-cost struggle’. 
  One of the ways in which the surveilled bodies attempt to manage the 
experience of the surveillance which might end up in the recreation of their 
autobiography as a story of crime through technological narration is the production of a 
new daily language, addressing an unknown listener as well as the known receiver of a 
speech particularly on the phone due to the fact that the telephone systems (mobile or 
wired) constitutes the ‘main artery of the surveillance systems’ as one of the former 
intelligent service agent has told me in an interview in Ankara. The imaginary and 
potential eavesdropper is always present in the talks, altering the very nature of the 
daily language and producing it in the forms of artificiality. A journalist working for a 
pro-Kurdish news agency in Diyarbakır explains how this consciousness affects his 
daily communications, ‘all talks are prolonged and became explanatory when it is not 
needed. I don’t speak on the phone as I used to any more. I give full explanations about 
everything that I speak about on the phone. Not because the other does not get what 
I’m talking about, but to minimize the risk of manipulation of what I say by the 
constant guests on our line’.  Thus, this amalgamated force generates a collective 
desperation due to the felt loss of control in communications and meaning. 
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The ordinary daily language, which all of us dwell by, is not only instrumental 
and practical, but also performative in the sense that nuances of meaning are captured 
and determined within the context of speech and diction. Thus, the amputation of 
language brings forth the felt loss of possibilities of language games, jokes, humors, 
ironies and gossips, which make an ordinary speech and daily conversation a dwelling 
container for human interaction.43 A primary school teacher in Diyarbakır tells me that 
he ‘cannot even make gossips. Because you know, all conversations are being read in 
courts. I mean the problem is not only that you have no privacy, no secrets any more, 
but also your relationships can be troubled’ due to the potentials that private might 
become public and the coherent conversation might become incoherent or might take 
up other meanings in unpredictable ways through the technological re-presentation. 
The boundaries between private and public that protect the invasion of one from 
another evaporate.  
  In addition to the extra carefulness that they adopt in their daily speeches on 
the phone or in particular places where they are sure of its surveillance, most of my 
informants routinely clear the digital files they keep in their computers, the mail 
inboxes, the CDs and flash-disks not to leave any material for the manipulative 
surveillance regimes to fabricate what is not theirs. This, however, changes the very 
nature of the relationship between the users and their machines that provides the basis 
for the control of communicability of users both by themselves and by the state.  
A female informant in her ‘30s, says ‘my computer, my cellphone used to feel 
like the extensions of my body, now I feel like, there is someone else between my 
things and myself. I don’t want to keep anything in my computer or my cell phone’. I 
                                                 
43 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley, 2009), 
for my analysis of ordinariness of ordinary language where human beings dwell by during 
their daily communications and practices. 
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have elsewhere explored the ways in which people of Turkey grew attachment with 
their digital technologies such as cellphone not only due to the machines’ instrumental 
and display value, but also due to the seemingly liberating effect they produce as the 
users find uses of these technologies in doing whatever they normally cannot do in the 
existing social structures, and in their daily lives. On the one hand, this ‘doing’ with 
digital technologies contributed to having a private world outside the monitoring of 
familial authorities, and creating a world of self where desired self-design is produced 
by using the technological means such as save, delete, edit for the general user 
publics44. It also yielded to the political mobilization of crowd to take the streets for a 
political protest through de-centralized text messages, to the dutiful and playful 
exercise of unfamiliar mother Kurdish language through texting among peers, 
transforming the Turkish-speaking public spaces into Kurdish-speaking soundscapes 
with the ringtones of cellphones etc., for the counterpublic users of Kurds,45 on the 
other.  
  Thus the affect of this new form of control on the surveilled bodies who are 
conscious of their surveillance contributes to the realm of incommunicability in various 
ways. The amputation of daily language, the shrink of all public spaces of 
communication and the distortion of the relationship between the human and the 
machines that is both in the service of neo-liberal and authoritarian technological 
power, and of the resistive potentialities, by allowing the generation of critical 
discourses, language and counterpublics are the main operations of this new form of 
power. However, when the means of protecting oneself from this sort of force and of 
expressing oneself in any known language inside and outside the institutions, non-
                                                 
44  Burçe Çelik, Technology and National Identity: Mobile Communications and The 
Evolution of a post-Ottoman Nation, (London: IB.Tauris, 2011). 
45 Burçe Çelik, “Appropriation of Cell Phones by Kurds: The Social Practice of Political 
Identities in Turkey”, in The Mobile Media Reader, (ed) Noah Arceneaux and Anandam 
Kavoori, (New York: Peter Lang, 2012). 
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places seem to be lost, the motivation to use all non-places for resistance might become 
more forceful. While the inmates started a hunger strike, which lasted approximately 70 
days with a demand for Kurdish language rights in courts as well as in education, and 
end to the denial of PKK leader's right to communicate with lawyers, the younger 
digital political bodies outside prisons continue their struggle, particularly with a strive 
to gain the means of communicability in digital spaces as well as in streets.  
 
The production of the political in digital counterpublics 
  
  The recognition of limitations and inequalities that subsist in the virtual world 
and the potentialities that are immanent to the artificiality (the virtual self-design) of 
this non-place contributes to the ‘produsership’ of activists. Particularly after the Arab 
Spring where the activists made use of digital communication technologies to organize 
collective action and prepare the ground for taking action against the authoritarian state 
power, especially in Egypt through the forums, blogs and social media, Kurdish activist 
seem to be more motivated to believe in the power of the net to alter the political 
culture in effective ways. Since the most pressing effect of the contemporary regimes 
of control is upon the political individuals’ communicative capabilities, the Internet 
becomes a means of creating a resistive possibility in the hands of Kurdish users, 
including the Kurdish politicians, for the production of new and alternative 
communication platforms where political users ideally do not only voice their critiques, 
concerns, demands, but also produce their own counterpublics, textual representations 
and discourses to change the political and social landscape in which they live. A male 
activist in Diyarbakır recounts how he decided and started to use the digital 
technologies for his political struggle:   
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90 per cent of Kurds write [on the net] with other persona, 
using other proxies etc., we know that we are not free on the 
virtual either, we know that we are considered as threats, this is 
something transferred from the real world. It is like the 
political consciousness to desire not to decipher one’s identity, 
it is the outcome of political reality, not fear.. I have always 
been a regular user… I created characters for myself. So I 
thought if I can create a character that becomes very popular 
on the net, I can do many other things over there. This is how I 
do it, how I started using it for my own purposes’. 
 
Particularly against the existing forms of information monopoly and media 
synopticism, Kurds appropriate the virtual space to make their own news and share it 
with the larger public, preferably containing ones unfamiliar to the Kurdish reality. 
The News Network 
  Apart from professional online news agencies such as ANF and DİHA, and 
web TV such as Nurce, IMC TV etc., amateur news agencies, blogs and social media 
are adopted by the political agents to create an alternative news space that would 
ideally have an effect on people’s agenda and their decision making, while the news is 
central to the making of political culture in Turkey. For instance, the Uludere/Roboski 
case which did not get coverage in mass media for some ten hours after the massacre 
due to the governmental pressure on mediascape was first announced in these pro-
Kurdish news agencies, then spread to the social media (twitter and Facebook), and 
thousands of people were called for demonstrations against the massacre via de-
centralized messages on the net. Most of my informants have spoken about the resistive 
power of the net in terms of mobilizing collective action with a reference to the protests 
against Uludere that was largely organized through social media messages. One of my 
male university students commented on this in Istanbul, by saying ‘we have seen how 
crucial these sites are for us in Roboski example. People may react to what is being 
done to us, only if they are informed about the truth. Roboski is not the first massacre 
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of civil Kurds, but it is the first one that many people became aware of, thanks to the 
Internet’.  
 The net in the hands of Kurds is also appropriated for building communities 
and for mobilization of people to participate in collective action whose targets exceed 
the organization of flash or political mobs. For instance, while the hunger strike of 
imprisoned Kurds did not find any coverage in media and support from larger public in 
Turkish political landscape, some Kurdish netizens opened an account in Facebook 
(Açlık Postası -Hunger Post- which then turned into Ötekilerin Postası -Others’ Post-, 
a social network group active both in Facebook and Twitter) with an aim to make news, 
increase the awareness about the strike and support the strikers. The founder of 
Ötekilerin Postası explains how they decided to create their Facebook group: 
‘What the government has been doing is to silence all 
others. The mainstream media were contributing to this 
aim. We asked ourselves, why don’t we create our own 
news network. Then, we began doing citizen journalism 
[on social networks]. We wanted to make objective news 
about the medical conditions of inmates that were on 
hunger strikes to inform their families and the larger 
public. We knew that there would be pressure from the 
state, but we have nevertheless continued’.  
 
 Açlık Postası has become, unexpectedly, as the founder of the network says, 
one of the most alternative news social network groups in a very short time. Through 
the virtual community of followers and contributers, they organized a campaign by 
calling everyone to withdraw money from their bank account and write that ‘do not 
remain silent to the strikes’ and put the money into ATM machines to make others 
engage with the discourses written on the banknotes. Along with this campaign, 
political netizens continued publishing photos of the strikers with provocative 
messages, with a claim to decipher the existence of mass hunger strike and opening 
discussion sites about the strike to mobilize people to become supporters of the struggle 
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of the strikers. In the end, when the strike has become an undeniable issue to be 
discussed in the political landscape; the government took an action to communicate 
with the leader of PKK to make him stop the strike. The strike ended; the talks between 
the state and the PKK leader have eventually restarted in January 2013. The group, 
then, changed the name into Ötekilerin Postası and continues to be followed by 
thousands of users, who do not only include Kurds but all others who have lost their 
trust in the mainstream media if they ever had.46 Neither the Uludere case nor the 
campaigns supporting hunger strike are mere outcomes of the particular use of the net. 
However, these examples show how the virtual and the actual circulate and affect each 
other in the insurgent politics of Kurds and also others when their voices, 
representations and their language and discursive practices are attempted to be silenced 
through the digital surveillance, media synopticism and juridicial operations. 
Resistance as the form of new discourse: ‘modern Kurdi perspective’ 
 Along with the struggle to create an alternative news platform that would 
ideally resist the synoptic control of power, the Kurdish users, particularly the younger 
ones aim to present and develop a ‘modern Kurdi perspective’, as some of my 
informants have put it, by way of Internet. The ‘modern Kurdi perspective’ refers to a 
search for a new political subjectivity, new discourse and a new language that differs 
from the traditional Kurdish discourse, while not breaking the continuity with the 
historical claims of cultural and political rights. The collective called Kurd 2.0 who 
controls different personas on social media (Özgür Amed in Facebook, Özgür Gündem, 
                                                 
46 During Gezi protests, the network has continued to be one of the popular networks for the 
protesters who are in the streets and in social media, actualizing the biggest national revolt of 
the Turkish history. However, the Facebook page has been closed for a short period of time 
and then recreated as once again a popular Facebook group with the help of the contributors 
and followers. 
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bijwenist-Kurd 2.2 47  in Facebook and Twitter etc), urban-dictionaries (like Tolaz), 
amateur news agencies (such as Amed Ajans) and blogs/sites/e-journals (Kurd 2.0) can 
be given as an example of this sort of political intervention that makes use of the net for 
modern Kurdi perspective. The founder of this Kurd 2.0 collective explains their 
understanding of ‘new language’ and ‘new discourse’: 
   The typical Kurdish discourse was based on the language of 
victim. We, Kurds, had tried to show that we were existent in 
the first place, then we tried to show that we’re dying. But 
there is no need for this. They already know what they did to 
us. It is as clear as crystal. What we need is real resistance. We 
need a new language to express ourselves. I perceive humor, 
irony and sarcasm as the most resisting tools to throw the 
fireball back to the ones who threw at us. This is what Kurd 
2.0 is about, as far as I am concerned. 
 
In the above narrative of the famous Kurdish digital activist, the Internet 2.0 
provides a new rationale for the social imaginary of a new political subjectivity with a 
new discourse, and a language where potentially all Kurdish users can become the 
producers of discourses that would represent themselves in a way that challenges the 
typical representations of Kurds as a victimized group, as a political identity whose 
language is diseased by Turkish. This activist, who lives in Diyarbakır in his 30’s, 
defines Turkish as ‘a virus’ not only as a language that the state obliges all citizens to 
speak, write and receive schooling in, but also as a discourse which also affected the 
ways in which Kurds speak about themselves, represent their political subjectivity and 
their claims in public/private spaces either in Kurdish or Turkish. The search for a new 
language and new perspective, which suggests a new political subjectivity that is 
framed as Kurd 2.0 is a struggle to transgress the dominance of Turkish as a discourse 
(not merely as a language of everyday life and institutional practice), which locks up 
                                                 
47 They keep upgrading the name Kurd 2.0 as the state or companies such as Facebook closes 
their blogs, sites or groups. Thus each upgrade refers to a new establishment of the same 
group that comes after the censorship of the previous one. 
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Kurdish language and discourse as a non-language, a discourse of backwardness, 
feudality, terrorism, armed rebellions, and of the periphery who has to sacrifice their 
lives for the struggle of their cultural and ethnic identity. The mode of interaction and 
addresses, and the form of language of the virtual exchange and discussions that allows 
for humor, laughter, abusive messages that become easily viral and effective in 
particular brevity required in Facebook and Twitter contributes to the conceptualization 
of Kurd 2.0 which proposes not only a new language, a new subjectivity and also a joy 
for the political action.  
A writer of Tolaz (a Kurdi humorous news network) that is connected to the 
counterpublic of Kurd 2.0 says: 
‘I was raised in a politically conscious family. But I was also 
assimilated, cannot really read and speak in Kurdish. Living in 
Istanbul, I was feeling isolated from political discussions. The 
Internet has become a place for me to meet other Kurds. I was 
writing for the forums, dictionaries like Zıtferheng. Then I 
came across the Kurd 2.0…The meaning of 2.0 is a lot for us. 
It is a new perspective, something like more integrated into the 
contemporary times. We speak about films, arts and also 
politics. We believe that the language of politics needs to be 
lightened. We need to entertain ourselves as well. The politics 
should be joyful. The serious guys who are old and respected 
(kelli felli) are like boring. I respect them but I cannot really 
listen to them for so long…The use of humor mobilizes our 
target group as well. We criticize everything, KCK cases, TC, 
including the Kurdish politics but in our humorous ways which 
is more critical and effective in our opinion’.  
 
The collective Kurd 2.0 in this regard opens like a counterpublic that reaches 
both Kurdish users and non-Kurdish ones, particularly in social networks like Facebook 
and Twitter addressing all with a critique posed not only against the dominant Turkish 
political culture that associates Kurdishness with threats to the unity of the country but 
also against the dogmatic historical Kurdish politics that always asks the young agents 
to 'sacrifice their life, love, and their future' as one of my young female informant has 
expressed. The desire to elaborate strategies of self-hood that initiate new signs of 
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identity, and innovate sites of collaboration, negotiation, and contestation, in the act of 
producing the textual representations is common among all these active users of the 
net, regardless of their link to the collective Kurd 2.0. The ‘light’ and sarcastic 
language and the joyful mode of address is not less political in their eyes but the most 
effective one. A PhD student, whom I interviewed with a reference of the Kurd 2.0 
founder, suggests that 'writing in EkşiSözlük' (a popular urban dictionary site) where he 
encountered with the 'white-democrat Turk' has made him 'search for new means of 
argumentation to challenge their memorized discourses about Kurdish movement'. In 
doing so, he explains, 'I also began to acknowledge that the way we make our language 
and we define ourselves have to change'. The encounter with others, Kurds and non-
Kurds alike in the flow of messages within the social laboratory of the net, motivate 
and provoke them to shatter the dichotomous thinking that many people think through 
in Turkey such as Turk/Kurd, terrorist/pacifist, modern Turks/traditional Kurds as well 
as through the fixed political identities with a distinct language, discourse and 
terminology that always need to be explanatory, serious and exclusive of what remain 
outside of it.  
For instance, a female university student of a law school in İstanbul, says that 
she puts the images of female guerrillas on her Facebook wall where she entertains 
communicating with her Turkish Facebook friends to ‘shock’ and show them the 
'absurdities of seeing the ones on the mountains as monsters'. While most of the female 
young activists appreciate the Kurdish movement for its struggle to liberate the Kurdish 
women from the traditional patriarchal norms, they also criticize the authoritarianism of 
the movement and of the dominant culture of Kurds whose effect is more pressing on 
the unprivileged gender positions. A university student of a medical school in Istanbul 
says, ‘I am Zaza. A Woman. A believer. And I will not deny that I used to have 
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sympathy for the cemaat [The Fethullah Movement] and for the party [PKK] at 
different times of my life...But however I define myself, I am told what I have to do. I 
am really fed up with this. I just want to be a human being who has a conscience’. She 
says her Facebook wall and her posts in various different digital communities do 
always intend to ‘surprise’ the ones who cling on the fixed identities, excluding what 
remains outside of them. At times as such, the self-creation of users in the social 
laboratory of virtual communities becomes an expression of the multitude or of the 
multiplicity that resists the commands of homogenization and standardization of power 
regimes.  
 In a similar vein, a transsexual woman, living in Diyarbakır, who created a 
Kurdish LGBT network (Hebun) on the Facebook and built a community out of 
silenced Kurdish LBGTs living in different areas in Turkey, says ‘we are struggling for 
our ethnic identities and also our sexual identities…we’ re struggling against the 
Turkish nationalists who deny the rights of Kurds and also macho Kurds who deny the 
rights of LGBTs and also bourgeois Turkish LBGTs who always speak with terms, 
concepts that ordinary people don’t understand’. Or from totally different perspective, a 
nationalist conservative activist (IBH) who has become popular in offline Kurdish 
political landscape after his presence that has attracted thousands of followers in 
Facebook and who also involves in polemical discussions with Kurd 2.0 says, ‘we need 
a theoretical, intellectual basis for our movement that has to be founded upon our 
history. My followers and I are having intellectual discussions about ourselves and our 
identity. We should be able to define ourselves with our self-determination as a nation, 
but this should not be exclusive of our religious identities, nor of our history and 
tradition’.  
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The counterpublics that are formed by these digital Kurds who do not aim to 
reach only Kurdish political agents but also others and recreate themselves and 
languages in new forms through the exchange and discussions are attempts to challenge 
the dominant culture and power -be it the state power, the official discourse of the 
Turkish authorities that are internalized by Turkish nationalists, the PKK doctrines, the 
patriarchal language that constitutes women, trans-identities in unprivileged positions. 
As one of the male users that I interviewed in Diyarbakır says, ‘all of us are searching 
for Kurdi perspective, Kurdi discourse, Kurdi language for everything we say…this is 
like we’re integrated into the contemporary era, but we are not assimilated.. We 
criticize even some notions, approaches of the movement but not with the language of 
T.C, or with the state’. In this regard, they attempt to generate a modern Kurdi 
perspective as a discursive event which is always already related to the political and 
ethnical struggle that has been carried out through armed struggle and representations 
of Kurds in the parliament, but also radically different from those in the way it takes up 
the task of producing an ever new language and discourse, housing the laughter, joy, 
fluidity in terms of being inclusive all oppositional subject positions and critical to any 
forms of authority, and articulating design, and aesthetics in digital mediascape and 
creative/cultural industries. In other words, they strive to produce the new means of 
‘the political’ as the state power adopts new pacification regimes to tame their 
communicative and cognitive capacities.  
  While the digital activism is not regarded as a form of political action that 
would bring ‘revolution’ by itself to the territory of the region by my informants, all of 
them consider the discursive potentialities of the net ‘one of the essential sites of 
contemporary political movements that aim to mobilize young people’ as Radikal 
Öğretmen (his Facebook persona) puts it, or  ‘something that shows that technologies 
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are not only in the service of the state, but also the people’s as a cafe co-owner in 
Diyarbakır in his late 20s states.  
 
Conclusion in the light of Gezi Protests 
 
 In this research, I have attempted to explore the form of state control and 
resistance of Kurds that make use of digital information technologies in the last couple 
of years in Turkey where not only the Kurdish political subjects but also other dissident 
agents of Turkey have been feeling the pressing pressure on the freedom of information 
and speech. The amalgamated force of law and technology on Kurdish bodies, which is 
also strengthened by the mass medial representations of Kurds, has amputated the 
possibilities of ordinary language, representation and discourses for Kurdish bodies. 
Particularly post-structuralist theories inform us that it is language that initiates 
subjectivity. Through the destructive attempts on the possibilities of language, 
historically on the mother language, currently on the means of speech and diction in 
any language that Kurds and their surveillors know, the political bodies, their 
subjectivities and communicative capabilities are attempted to be colonized.  
 I consider the digital activism of Kurds, as an attempt to regain the agency in 
meaning production, retrieval of the political body and the construction of a language 
to invent the means of speech and discourse that would ideally represent themselves at 
their self-presence. As most of my informants have underlined repetitiously, the 
activism on the net is the one that is relevant until someone takes off the plug and yet 
till that moment, it functions as a space for possibilities of communications that might 
have an impact on the real life. The Kurds for whom the public and private spaces of 
speech and diction are shrunk due to the prevalent surveillance, create a counterpublic 
where they reach out the others and recreate themselves in the exchange and 
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discussions with others out of the virtual space of the net. The political Kurds, 
particularly young ones, appropriate these technologies, specifically the Internet to 
transform the political language and traditionally instituted political subjectivities as 
well as the larger dominant political culture that institute them as unprivileged citizens 
of Turkey that are attempted to be pacified in changing regimes of power. As cyborgs, 
simians, or produsers living, communicating and producing within digital ecology, they 
know how to go around the filter systems, to meet and reach others in ways that affect 
the non-Kurds in digital mediascape. They are political. Their digital daily struggle is a 
cultural and political struggle that cannot be dissociated from the historical insurgent 
politics of Kurds, claiming the language and education rights. Yet, the way they 
produce the political is radically different from their elders or from the ones’ who are 
involved in older forms of political struggle. They take politics seriously, but the 
language they use, seem to enjoy the possibilities of humor, laughter and sarcasm. They 
value the political struggle as an essential part of their subjectivity, however they do 
not want to accept the call to sacrifice their lives, youth and love for the political 
struggle. They are the counterpublic of the new pacification regimes that make use of 
fluid system to control the economic, social and political forces.  
 I suggest that the research that I present here informs in great deal the whys 
and wherefores of the Gezi Revolt of 2013’s Turkey. As I understand the nationwide 
protests, it is a historic one of young people, belonging to different social classes, 
holding different socio-cultural and political stands that have the collective will to end 
state authoritarianism. The authoritarianism that I attempted to sketch the outline here 
with a focus on how it is enacted on the Kurdish movement through adopting the whole 
means of technological surveillance and imperial power regimes of the global 
networks. The digital activism of young Kurds, on the other hand, informs us about the 
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ways in which millions of middle class urbanite young people who are often criticized 
as an apolitical digital generation by their elders appropriate the social media and the 
streets to produce new means of ‘the political’. Just as the digital counterpublics of 
Kurds do, the Gezi protesters use the digital mediascape to change the political 
landscape of Turkey where their voices matter and where they also hear, see and speak 
with each other beyond the usual encounters trapped within the social boundaries of 
identities. The Gezi protesters adopt the digital mediascape in which they inhabit on 
daily basis to create their own political language and subjectivity, generating the joy of 
political action, the humorous power of political discourse, asserting their agency to 
make their own decisions about their lives, environment and discourses in similar ways 
that young Kurdish political activists have been doing for a while. The Gezi Protest has 
been a momentous one precisely in moments where the protesters who now grow 
consciousness that there were groups who have been victimized in the past and in the 
present in the way they are being victimized now by the authoritarian regime of the 
state, including media synopticism, and police brutality. In one of those moments, a 
twitter user writes to Bijwenist-Kurd 2.0 that ‘I am so ashamed of my own fascist 
attitude towards you. I now understand what you have been through with this corrupted 
media, another one writes ‘I apologize to you my friends, we have been following the 
Kurdish problem from this media. It’s been our stupidity. A big apology’. 48  In 
instances as such ‘the modern Kurdi perspective’ that produce and is produced by the 
counterpublics of Kurds reaches the climax where the left of the story will be based on 
a question of how far the counterpublic can be extended in the way it transforms the 
identities of members, their languages and the political consciousness of the sheer 
possibility of resistance.  
                                                 
48 Cited from Burçe Çelik, ‘The Revolt of the Diverse Youth and the Production of the Political’, 
opendemocracy, (7.June.2013) (www.opendemocracy.net). 
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